Phil Ivey is 30th Casino Cheats Hall of Fame Inductee!!!

Newest Hall of Fame Cheat!

It has happened!

Phil Ivey has become the newest and 30th member of the International Casino Cheats and Poker Cheats Hall of Fame! 

Congratulations, Phil! If anyone deserves this honor, it is surely you!

 Ivey had been under consideration for induction since just after his massive baccarat edge-sorting scam came to light, and while casino sleuths and experts debated whether or not Ivey's casino actions constituted cheating, the Casino Cheats Hall of Fame Induction Committee could not reach a verdict, thus being the first time we've ever had a hung casino-cheats jury.

But the cheating credentials Ivey has, not only as a baccarat edge-sorting cheat but also as a master of poker cash-games collusion (BIG CASH GAMES COLLUSION), were just plain overwhelming and could no longer be ignored by the Casino Cheats Hall of Fame.

So now we have a second professional World Series of Poker tournament champion in the Hall, so I am sure that the first, the notorious Russ Hamilton, will be glad to slide over a bit and make room for Phil's bust in the haloed Hall!

And I imagine that the Induction Committee will soon be considering Phil's foxy-lady partner in casino crime for induction as well. Her name is "Sun" and her bust would look just great next to his!

Read Phil Ivey's Induction here.

How effective is NORA software against Casino Cheats and Advantage-Players?

You make sense of it!

If you haven't heard of it, NORA (Non-obvious relationship awareness) software probes gigantic data bases in search of obscure matches between pertinent information. Two of its biggest subscribers and users have become law-enforcement personnel investigating terrorists, and, believe it or not, casino security and surveillance agencies investigating casino and poker cheats as well as their own crooked employees.

The NORA software is able to sift through masses of seemingly meaningless data and come up with connections between people at the same workplace or connected to the workplace that raise suspicion and eventually lead investigators to criminal conspiracies or worse.

 So--what about casinos...any value in this?

Okay, let's take a hypothetical casino situation involving Tom, Dick and Harry.

Tom lives at Address A. He is a casino dealer at Casino A. This information by itself means very little if nothing.

Now add Dick to the equation.

Dick lives at Address B, which happens to be a block away from Address A. He is a casino floor supervisor at Casino  A. This information by itself means very little, but if coupled with the info on Tom, we note that they live near each other and both work at the same casino...big deal, right!

Now add Harry to the equation.

Harry lives at Address C, which is far from Address A and B, but he happens to work for the company that distributes playing cards to Casino A, where both Tom and Dick happen to work. 

Getting interesting?

Well, not right off the bat, but then let's add this BIG hypothetical ingredient to the stew: Casino A gets hit by a major edge-sorting card scam at the baccarat table, the same scam made notorious by poker great/alleged casino-cheat Phil Ivey, in which the cards used in the baccarat game had defects that allowed the cheats to know their values when lying face down on the table and when they're the top card in the shoe.

The cheats walk with millions.

Then during a long investigation, surveillance sleuths using the NORA software come up with the above cross-referenced informaton and conclude that Tom, Dick and Harry all knew each other and therefore had the means to pull off the scam. The obvious reasoning is that Harry at the card-distribution company passed the info on the defective cards to either Tom or Dick or both, and then the conspiracy was hatched.

Should you buy into this?

Well, I have never been a big fan of the high-tech recognition software that supposedly puts casino and poker cheats out of business before they start.

It all began over a decade ago with the biotech facial-recognition software that reportedly recognized cheats and hustlers right between their eyes when they walked into the casino--even if in full disguise--because no one can change the metrics of their eyes.

All I can tell you is that even though I've been retired from cheating casinos for a decade and a half, I still am constantly inside them during my duties as a casino game-protection consultant and surveillance and floor staff trainer.

Working undercover, I got recognized just one time by a casino employee who hadn't known I was to be at his casino.

Did he recognize me from any facial-recognition software?

No...absolutely not!

He recognized me from a History Channel casino documentary TV show that he'd seen a dozen times. And besides, I have never heard of any major casino scams thwarted by early recognition of casino cheats through facial recognition software.

So what about NORA?

Well, it might help out substantially locating terrorists, but I am not sold that too many of the Tom-Dick-and-Harry scenarios like the one I painted above are going to re-play in the real casino world. 

One reason is that even if NORA software can sift through all that meaningless info and make it appear relevant, there are just too many casino employees, suppliers, distributors and other connected people living near each other and working in the same casino.

Much better chance of catching the poker cheats and the casino cheats at the tables.

What about Poker Computers in Live Brick and Mortar Poker Rooms?

At a brick and mortar poker table?

I am hearing about this online-poker cheating transformation to live brick and mortar poker games, which raises many new questions in the poker and poker-cheating world.

First of all, the use of any electronic or digital gadget in a poker room is considered cheating, and may in some jurisdictions, especially Nevada, be prosecuted as a felony.

But apart from the legal ramifications, do poker brick and mortar bots work well enough to give players using them a distinct advantage over their opponents at the table?

The theory is that the poker computer, which of course has to be well disguised and avoid casino surveillance detection, can memorize all the exposed cards, calculate the cards remaining in the deck, and then feed that information to the user, who then decides how to play the hand. This is much the same function of poker bots being used to cheat online poker games.

But is it enough?

I do not think so.

In a casino game like blackjack where there is no human element affecting the bets after they’re placed, computers can be very effective for card-counters and advantage players. The same holds true for roulette where computers can help determine biases in the spinning wheel and quadrants where the ball will land depending on speed and revolution.

But poker, both online and off, is a game of intricate strategy and bluffing, in which skilled players constantly change their strategies to enhance their chances in any given set of conditions. That facet of the game is too hard to keep up with—even for computers. As far as I know, even the most sophisticated computers cannot latch on to players’ changing strategies and bluffing patters.

So the bottom line here is until someone invents the ultimate poker computer that can read players’ minds, this is one type of artificial intelligence that can stay away from the poker tables.

Casino Game Protection Post: How Live Casino Surveillance Communication Fails

Do I see it?

An integral part of the surveillance and security apparatus protecting live brick and mortar casinos is strong communication between surveillance operators upstairs and casino personnel on the floor working the gaming tables. 

Without it, protecting casinos will not get much help from all that state of the art video and audio technology.

A prime example of the failure of these systems occurred when I was active cheating casinos.

I was pastposting $5,000 chips (called “chocolates” in some high-end Vegas casinos) underneath $100 chips, known almost everywhere as “blacks.” This was a major move taking five grand a pop out of casinos, sometimes ten when my teammates and I used two chocolates at a time.

After an incredible run of 151 consecutive successful chocolate-chip pastposts in July and August 1995, we finally had a “miss” on a Caesars Palace blackjack table when a pit boss refused to pay the pastposted bet. In the aftermath, the heat that came down inside the Vegas casinos was a helluva lot hotter than the scorching desert air outside.

Griffin Investigations and the totality of Las Vegas casino surveillance shot into action to try and put my team and I out of business. They immediately flooded Vegas with circulars advising casinos that a pastposting team was running amok slipping chocolate $5,000 chips underneath $100 blacks.

It was enough to make us stop using that move—but not enough to put us out of business.

We discussed out “big heat” problem and soon came up with a very clever idea that enabled us to go right back into the hot casinos:

Pastpost yellow $1,000 chips under $25 greens.

True, the change was a reduction in our profit-per-move, but taking a grand off the table each time was better than having to pack up and leave town.

So we went on another live casino-cheat rampage doing the reduced pastpost move. Right back inside Caesars Palace, we encountered another steamy situation. The pit boss was suspicious but still ordered the dealer to pay the bet.

Why?

Because the intercasino advisory warned of chocolate $5,000 chips being pastposted underneath $100 black chips—not $1,000 yellow chips being pastposted underneath $25 green chips.

For this reason, we were able to continue doing the same move as if we had never been doing it with the chocolate chips. After a hundred more of the yellow-green combo, we took heat and then, believe it or not, went right back into the casinos slipping $500 purple chips underneath $5 red chips.

Even I couldn’t believe it!

Where’s the surveillance communication failure?

Simply its lack of communicating the totality of the move. The advisory should have given a description of the move and advised that it could be done with other high-denomination chips besides the $5,000 chocolates.

This failure of proper communication between casino surveillance departments and the casino personnel in the gaming pits still exists rampantly today.

It is always one of the key points I make to casino floor and surveillance staffs when I train them in the field of casino table-game protection. 

Casino Game Protection Post: Top 10 Reasons High-Tech Surveillance Systems Do Not Always Protect Casinos from Cheats

Many of you experience the latest state of the art surveillance video systems at the World Game Protection Conference, but what you should also know is that in many cases it is not enough to stop the casino-cheats and advantage-players.

Here is a top-10 list why:

1) Casino personnel depend too much on them.

2) Casino personnel lack ability to spot cheat scams on their own.

3) Professional cheats have much more knowledge about cheating than casino personnel.

4) Lack of proper and rapid communication between casino floor personnel and surveillance operators.

5) Casino personnel lack ability to pick up on cheats and their scams beforethey’re put into operation.

6) Failure of casino personnel to understand how cheats silently communicate in casinos.

7) Failure of casino personnel to recognize how casino cheats obtain large denomination chips without their knowledge.

8) Failure of casino personnel to differentiate between a set-up bet and a completely honest bet.

9) Casino personnel lacks understanding of the psychology casino cheats use to control them.

10) Casinos do not implement proper cage operations to pick up on cheats cashing out chips.

My Own Investigation into 2015 WSOP Cheating Allegations against Valeriu Coca

WSOP Cheat?

You've all heard about the very serious card-marking cheating allegations against Moldavian poker player Valeriu Coca at the 2015 WSOP $10,000 Heads-Up Championship, in which several players were spooked by the handsome player whose face was shielded by dark sunglasses during the play of that tournament. They accused Coca of somehow marking the cards with invisible dye, perhaps only viewable through the lenses of those glasses or contact lenses behind the glasses.

The WSOP officials released this statement about their findings: "Once issues were brought to our attention, we immediately commenced an investigation and worked cooperatively with the Nevada Gaming Control Board. The investigation that was performed has now been completed by all parties. At this time, the matter is considered closed and the fifth-place finisher in Event Number-Ten will now have his funds released for payment."

I took a serious look at this matter and I do believe that Coca had indeed cheated via marking the cards. I also believe the Nevada Gaming Control Board behind closed doors came to this same conclusion. However, it is always in the best interests of the WSOP that no cheating scandals envelop the event, especially after the huge UltimateBet online scandal engineered by for WSOP Main-Event Champion, Russ Hamilton.

I have no proof of my claim here, as I did not have access to any evidence or materials in the case...but it is my strong gut feeling--and I am usually right!

No! It’s not me out there doing Savannah!!!

Me doing it--but it's only a Game Protection demo!

I can’t believe I’m even saying this! Or better yet…that I have to say this!

It’s been twelve and a half years since I wised up the casino world to my notorious Savannah roulette pinching-move, still generally considered the best casino-cheat move ever concocted, and I am still getting twenty emails a week from both sides of the table.

The cheats are asking me the obvious: Does it still work? Can I still go out and do it?

Casino and surveillance personnel ask if I am aware of anyone out there doing it! LOL

Well, I have to be honest, in spite of my sworn commitment not to encourage casino-cheating to anyone. But the truth is that Savannah is still super effective in the world’s live casinos, mainly because the vast majority of them still haven’t figured out how to safeguard their roulette tables against it. The few casinos that do know how to combat Savannah happen to be my clients in the field of casino table-game protection.

But the REAL Killer is the email I received yesterday from a Midwest US casino surveillance director whom I’d met several years ago at a game protection conference.

His email read: “Rich, I thought you retired years ago…but did you come out of retirement? I’m asking you this because a guy did a Savannah on us with a purple chip ($500) and I could have sworn it was you. The video was top-quality and he had on a hat, but I think I still recognized you! Please say it ain’t so!” (He did not add LOL)

Well…wow! That really threw me for a loop! I wrote back simply: “It ain’t so!” (I did not add LOL either)

Well, to all you casino and surveillance bosses out there who might see video of a guy who looks like me cheating casinos…

I did retire some fifteen years ago—and plan to stay that way! NO BULLSHIT PLEASE!

This all reminds me of a funny story that happened at Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut in 1994. I had just laid and claimed a $1,000 Savannah move that took tons of heat. The supervisor told the pit boss, and the pit boss held up the game to check with surveillance before paying me. After he received video verification that it was a legitimate bet, he ordered the dealer to pay me. Then he apologized and said to me,” I’m sorry for the delay but we received photos from Atlantic City casinos of some guy who looks like you cheating roulette wheels with the same bet.”

I nearly shit it my pants! Not from fear but from the unbelievable stupidity of his remark.

Oh, you have a question, right?

The answer is no…this wasn’t the same guy who is now a surveillance director in a Midwest casino…at least I hope not!!!

How Cheating Live Casino Dealers Slip Under the Radar

Despite the state of the art high-tech video surveillance systems protecting land-based casinos throughout the world, those dishonest employees who want to cheat their bosses still operate with huge success. Of course I am talking mainly about cheating dealers, some of whom work in tandem with crooked supervisors and pit bosses, others who keep their cheating gigs to themselves and the partners they use to take the money off the tables.

Trust her?

These dealers use a variety of methods to cheat the house, to cheat other players and then dump off that money to their cohorts, and even to cheat other dealers out of customer tips in certain situations. I will cover these methods in an upcoming article.

But here I want to talk about how and why they get away with it.

First and foremost is that sharp dealers who are educated in the goings on with casino table-game protection and surveillance know that video cameras can actually be their friends and not the deterrence to cheating and stealing that most people think they are.

This is because with the advent of more  and more state of the art technology designed to pinpoint surveillance personnel to inside dealer-cheating scams, the human beings, both on the casino floor and upstairs in the surveillance room, have less and less of an idea as to what’s going on in the real live casino-cheating world.

Knowing that supervisors and pit bosses constantly depend on the cameras to protect their asses, dealers in business for themselves really slip it to them without their ever catching on.

And the ways they rake their extra-curricular profits off the table are usually very simple and for modest amounts at a crack.

You all know about the big false-shuffle baccarat scams where dealers partner-up with Asian gangs and take out huge sums of money. It is true that these major cheating scores are still occurring frequently today, but those dealers who do get caught performing them face stiff prison sentences and lifetime bans from the industry.

Which is why the vast majority of casino-cheating dealers stick with the small stuff: a few hundred bucks here, a few hundred bucks there—just enough to double or triple their legitimate casino earnings.

Game Protection Post: Casino Game Protection--How I Do It

Many of you casino executives may have attended the recent World Game Protection Conference in Las Vegas and listened to various game-protection consultants present their methods and credentials. However, if you want the best to come to your casino and train your staff, this is how I do it.

My main goal in training casino floor staffs is to make them as efficient and knowledgeable as possible without depending on the video and surveillance systems. Simply put: to learn and recognize all facets of casino cheating and advantage play before it gets to the surveillance-department stage. As an ex-casino dealer who has performed many highly-effective inside casino scams, followed by 25 years as a professional casino-cheat, I can offer pretty good insight on how these things work from both sides of the tables. 

My main goal in training sureillance staffs is to remove them as much as possible from their video equipment and technology. In other words, teach them to be highly efficient even in the hypothethical circumstance that cameras did not exist. This is because floor supervisors and surveillance departments have become so dependent on the technology that many of its employees have very little knowledge of what cheating and advantage play is really about. I always like to say, "A camera cannot tap you on the shoulder and tell you there´s a cheat-move going down on BJ 4." You´ve got to be able to identify what you see on the video or what you´re watching on the live game. If a floorperson does not recognize a cheat or advantage-play team at the tables, the cameras above are not going to alert them to it. Game protecftion must work from the floor up.  

If you have read anything about my cheating days, I was able to use cameras and surveillance departments to actually help me cheat casinos (see the Savannah move on my website). Capable cheats can actually separate the casino floor from surveillance departments by using psychology that overcomes game-protection procedure. For example, I was able to place $5,000 bets without dealers notifying supervisors, and as well was able to prevent the floor from notifying surveillance when I was actually caught cheating, all by use of psychology. 

Normally when I conduct seminars, the audience is a mix of floor and surveillance people. I find that this works well because communication between the two and working as one is integral for good game and casino protection. In more casinos than not, surveillance and the floor are not on the same page.

One thing I like to do is have a member of the casino floor staff, unbeknownst to the rest of the seminar attendees, participate in my cheating demonstrations while their peers are also seated around the gaming table. I have already met with this individual before the seminar and taught him how to do cheating moves. Then when he actually does a cheating move during the seminar, the audience is shocked to see how easy it was for him to do it. This type of active-attendee participation works really well in generating more interestest and closer attention from the audience.

I do not do any tired-old powerpoint presentations.I do not waste much time going over videos of moves you have probably seen a thousand times. Everything is hands-on work on tables and throughout a casino. I not only teach how casino cheat-moves and advantage-play teams operate at the tables, I stress how they prepare inside the casino before their moves, how they communicate on and away from the tables, how they cash out their checks, and all the other necessary facets that must be known in order to have a chance of spotting the professional teams before they leave the casino with your money. I have found over the years that casinos have very little idea how cheats communicate, nor do they invest much time in learning how cheats, especially those working with high-denomination checks, obtain them and cash them out without drawing suspicion.

For example, in my later cheating-days I worked exclusively with $5,000 checks and on some nights had more than $50,000 of checks to cash out, However, I never once in my life cashed out a single $5,000 check. So how did I turn them into cash without raising eyebrows?

As far as direct training to surveillance depts alone goes, I like to put them in the shoes of a cheat or advantage player, show them how they think, plan and act. As I do with the floor staff, I take one member of the surveillance dept. and work with him alone before I meet the rest of the attendees. Then I teach him some cheating moves, and later we do a demonstration on the table while the rest are watching. As everyone is thinking I am going to do the cheat move, the surveillance guy does it and of course no one sees it go down. The point of this is twofold: firstly to  show how everything at a suspect table has to be watched; the second, how the best cheat moves are so easily done. My Savannah move, which arguably was the best low-tech move of all time, could be taught to you in under five minutes and can still be done at any casino if the staff cannot properly defend against it..

We would also discuss the high-tech scams, the baccarat edge-sorting and other hi-tech scams, but remember, the vast majority of casino scams are not high-tech. We would also spend time talking about inside-dealer and floorpeople scams, on which I have much experience. As a dealer back in 1977, I was probably the first to do the infamous false-shuffle baccarat scam later done on a huge scale by the Tran organization 25 years later. 

Another thing I like to do out the outset of the seminar is give a 20-question quiz to everyone entitled "How good a casino cheat and advantage player would you be?"

Then we go over it without giving the correct answers, and then at the end of the seminar the same quiz is repeated, and we compare the scores to see how much the attendees have learned and retained.

This is a general overview of how I work. Of course each training/seminar is tailored to the property epending on your exact needs and who will be attending.